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Leadership is an essential quality that all homeland security professionals should 
possess. Unfortunately, the nature, scope, importance, and complexity of protecting the 
United States has overshadowed the fact that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
employees are not receiving the proper leadership training. Furthermore, lack of adequate 
training tools within the department is making it increasingly difficult to deliver the 
limited amount of available leadership training education. Personnel surveys reveal that 
the quality of leadership within the department is not getting better, and in some cases, it 
is perceived as worsening. As the first generation of homeland security leaders and 
managers depart the organization, DHS has a responsibility to its future generation of 
employees to identify leadership training and education deficiencies and provide 
individuals with the proper leadership tools for individual and departmental success. This 
thesis proposes that senior DHS leaders admit to the leadership training deficiencies, 
create programs to fill leadership training gaps in an integrated manner throughout the 
organization, develop accountability measures, and utilize portions of effective training 
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I. DHS LEADERSHIP UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
In light of recent events—including the flawed Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
emergency response, 72 employees appearing on terrorist watch lists, and a 95 percent 
failure rate for Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security screenings—the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been scrutinized for its leadership, or more 
appropriately for the lack thereof.1 According to a 2015 federal employee survey, DHS 
ranks dead last among large agencies when it comes to morale.2 DHS has attempted to 
boost morale through several internal efforts, but morale decline continues.3 There is a 
strong case to be made that leadership stands at the center of this failure; however, 
leadership also could be the way out of the problem. Many organizations around the 
world, large and small, have dealt with leadership failures, and those that have given 
proper attention to leadership training and techniques have proven there is future success 
to be had. 
This thesis sets out to use elements of the Department of Defense (DOD), 
specifically the Department of the Navy, as a model by which DHS can improve its 
current leadership programs and possibly develop new ones. It is not my intent to prove 
that DHS is inferior when it comes to all aspects of leadership training, techniques, and 
management, but rather to show that long-established organizations can provide valuable 
insight into leadership successes and failures, which may result in positive changes 
within DHS. In the end, I found that although the Navy has not produced optimum 
methodologies for institutional leadership training, its ability to distribute and track 
leadership training through classrooms, online, and blended learning methods is far 
superior to that of DHS. 
                                                 
1 Adam Credo, “72 DHS Employees on Terrorist Watch List,” Washington Free Beacon, December 6, 
2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/72-dhs-employees-on-terrorist-watch-list/.  
2 Jerry Markon, “Homeland Security Ranks Last in Morale—Again—but Jeh Johnson’s Morale Is 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What can the Department of Homeland Security learn from the Department of 
Defense’s leadership training programs and methodologies? This thesis explores several 
aspects of leadership training and development by examining past, present, and proposed 
methodologies by both the Navy and DHS. Leadership success cannot be achieved by 
utilizing one type of technique or methodology. However, empirical data and theory can 
help determine which leadership tenets remain at the forefront of successful 
organizations. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
DHS is made up of more than 240,000 employees.4 When DHS was created in 
2001, 22 different federal departments and agencies were merged to create one of the 
largest government agencies ever.5 The leaders and managers of these diverse agencies 
were given the task of bringing the agency together, literally and figuratively. The result 
so far is an uneasy blend of organizations and functions, which is evident in the 
department’s organizational chart (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
4 About DHS,” Department of Homeland Security, ““June 29, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs.  
5 “Who Joined DHS,” Department of Homeland Security, ““September 15, 2015, 
https://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs.  
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Figure 1.  DHS Organizational Framework6 
 
                                                 
6 “Department Organizational Chart,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 27, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Department%20Org%20Chart.pdf.  
 4
DHS deals with various types of management programs, such as domestic 
incident management, counterterrorism management, crisis management, and emergency 
management. Some of these management programs are so large that they require their 
own federal organizations—such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) or the National Incident Management System (NIMS). A number of DHS’s 
agencies are tasked with dealing with some aspect of emergency management. As 
defined by the Post-Katrina Act of 2006, emergency management is:  
the governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities to 
build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, 
respond to, recover from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism or man-made disasters.7 
Among the emergency support functions within the Incident Command System, eight of 
the fifteen functions have the word management written into their description.8 
Leadership and management are not the same thing, however. Paul Hersey 
defines leadership as “any attempt to influence the behavior of another individual or 
group,” and management as “working with and through others to accomplish 
organizational goals.”9 Similarly, Taylor and Rosenbach describe leadership as “getting 
people to work together to make things happen that might not otherwise occur, or to 
prevent things from happening that would ordinarily take place.”10 Understanding that 
leadership and management are two different skills an individual can possess is 
important. Moreover, being good at one does not necessarily mean being good at the 
other. Organizations desiring to teach their employees leadership and management skills 
must understand this distinction in order to create training programs that reflect the 
tenants of leadership and management individually, rather than attempting to teach both 
at the same time as if they were one and the same. 
                                                 
7 James D. Ramsay and Linda A. Kiltz, Critical Issues in Homeland Security: A Casebook (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2013), Kindle edition, 297–298.  
8 John Fass Morton, Next Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course to 
National Preparedness (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), Kindle edition, 105–106. 
9 Paul Hersey, The Situational Leader (Escondido, CA: Center for Leadership Studies, 1984), 16.  
10 Lincoln Andrews, “Leadership,” in Military Leadership: The Pursuit of Excellence, ed. Robert 
Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric Rosenbach (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 2009), 1.  
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The first mission of DHS’s five core missions is to prevent terrorism and enhance 
security. This mission entails three goals: preventing terrorist attacks; preventing the 
unauthorized acquisition, importation, movement, or use of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear materials and capabilities within the United States; and reducing 
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, essential leadership, and 
major events to terrorist attacks and other hazards.11 By the definition of Taylor and 
Rosenbach, it is clear that leadership plays a vital role in mission success.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although many books have been written about individual leaders themselves, few 
professionals agree on the exact formula for leadership. For instance, James MacGregor, 
a Pulitzer Prize winner wrote, “we know a lot about leaders, yet very little about 
leadership.”12 The U.S. armed forces form something of an exception to this rule, as 
much of their training, development, and thought concerns leadership. Still, there remains 
some question as to whether leaders are born or made and what impact institutional 
leadership training can have on individuals and organizations. 
Adhering to the premise that leaders are made (i.e., leadership can be taught), 
many organizations create lists of the tenets of leadership they think are most important. 
For example, the Department of Defense publishes The Armed Forces Officer, which lists 
five leadership competencies, including bond of trust, setting and enforcing standards, 
setting the example, modeling courage, and building and sustaining morale.13 As another 
example, the Senior Executive Service (SES) lists eight characteristics that leaders should 
possess in the Department of Homeland Security: principled, people-centered, effective 
communicator, performance-centered, diversity advocate, highly collaborative, nimble 
and innovative, and a steward of public resources.14 More lists are contained in such 
                                                 
11 “Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security,” Department of Homeland Security, ““May 6, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security.  
12 Andrews, “Leadership,” 1.  
13 Robert Wray Jr., Saltwater Leadership: A Primer on Leadership for the Junior Officer (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 32.  
14 Ibid., 34.  
 6
publications as The Fundamentals of Naval Leadership, The Division Officers Guide, 
Leadership Lessons of the White House Fellows, The Successful Executives Handbook, 
The AMA Handbook of Leadership, and so on. 
The problem with these lists is they do not explain how an individual is to acquire 
such traits if he or she does not already possess them. The debate over whether leadership 
can be learned or must be inherent is also found in the works of military writers. For 
instance, Milan Vego explains, “in general, leadership is the product of both heredity and 
personality.”15 In contrast, Rear Admiral Robert O. Wray Jr. argues that leadership can 
be learned and states, “You don’t have to be born with it. Whatever you are today, you 
can become a leader, if you choose.”16 Joseph L. Thomas, a distinguished professor of 
leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy comes down even more emphatically for nurture, 
rather than nature, as the stuff of good leaders, stating, “This theory of hereditary 
dominance has been rightly discarded by modern theorist, although echoes of it are still 
found in the work of contemporary theorist such as Harvard University’s Howard 
Gardner, countless biographical historians, and the military.”17 According to Thomas, 
leadership theories that include hereditary dominance are outdated and have been 
“augmented by other paradigms.”18 
However, experts on leadership note that some aspects do appear to be innate. 
Such character traits as courage, honor, character, pride, boldness, and creativity all come 
from a place within, strengthened by the institutional knowledge already acquired.19 
Vego states, “The principal requirement for a successful operational leader are high 
intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and the will to act, combined with the 
extensive professional knowledge and experience.”20 Therefore, it is important that 
                                                 
15 Milan Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” in Operational Leadership (Newport: Naval War 
College, 2009), x-6.  
16 Wray, Saltwater Leadership, 4.  
17 Joseph Thomas, Leader Development in the U.S. Department of Defense: A Brief Historical Review 
and Assessment for the Future (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Academy, 2009), 
http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/Leader%20Development%20History%20Thomas.pdf, 3.  
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” x-13.  
20 Ibid. 
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institutions identify non-hereditary characteristics of leadership they wish their 
employees to possess and train them to develop these traits over time. 
A significant aspect of leadership is understanding relationships between leaders 
and the people who are being led. Many military publications acknowledge this concept. 
The Navy’s Order 21 states that leadership is “the art of accomplishing the Navy’s 
mission through people.”21 Similarly, the U.S. Army leadership field manual states, 
“Your job as a leader isn’t to make everyone the same.”22 A leader “should try to 
understand individuals based on their own ideas, qualifications, and contributions and not 
jump to conclusions based on stereotypes.”23 A poor leader or organization will try and 
make everyone the same, treating people more like inventory rather than a valuable 
commodity.24 As Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrew states, “How absolutely 
important then that a leader know the personalities of his men.”25 
To be sure, leadership is not about popularity. Research shows that those who 
engaged in high-level tasks, such as mission planning and procedure development, but 
who were not engaged with their peers, are still considered leaders.26 Those who engaged 
with their peers, but did not participate in high-level tasks, are not considered leaders.27 
In other words, particularly in a mission-focused organization, actual expertise matters 
and can, at least to some degree, carry along a leader who may not possess the finest 
people skills—which, after all, figure more prominently in management.28 
                                                 
21Wray Jr., Saltwater Leadership, 5. 
22 Department of the Army, Battle-Tested Wisdom for Leaders in an Organization (FM 22–100) (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 36.  
23 Ibid.  




26 Andrews, “Leadership,” 2.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Committee on the Department of Homeland Security Workforce Resilience, Board on Health 
Sciences Policy, and Institute of Medicine, Security Workforce Resilience, A Ready and Resilient 
Workforce for the Department of Homeland Security Protecting Americas Front Line (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2013), 93. 
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Ultimately, however, the relationship between the leader and the people he or she 
leads must be transformational. according to Taylor and Rosenbach.29 Specifically, such 
a leader:  
motivates followers to perform beyond expectations by creating an 
awareness of the importance of the mission and the vision in such a way 
that followers share beliefs and values and can transcend self-interest to tie 
the vision to self-esteem and self-actualization, both higher order needs.30 
D. HYPOTHESES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
In “Operational Leadership,” Milan Vego explains, “military leadership can be 
explained in three basic levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.”31 Although DHS is a 
separate department from the DOD, it does share similar operational objectives. The 
operational leader, or commander as Vego defines the position, is responsible for 
completing the objectives assigned by his or her superior.32 The commander has the 
responsibility for “making critical decisions based on ambiguous information.”33 To 
accomplish tasks, leaders must rely on training, education, experience, and knowledge 
that have been taught to them by formal institutions designed for this purpose. In the 
DOD, individuals attend boot camp, Officer Candidate School (OCS), the Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC), or the military academies. For DHS, individuals attend 
Border Patrol Academy for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) for Secret Service. It is apparent that both DHS 
and the DOD understand the importance of providing individuals with basic training prior 
to becoming part of their respective organizations. If leadership training is not integrated 
into these basic levels of training as well as throughout career milestones, individuals will 
lack the appropriate leadership tools and be forced to manage from behind rather than 
lead from the front. 
                                                 
29 Andrews, “Leadership,” 2.  
30 Ibid., 3.  
31 Vego, “Joint Operational Warfare,” x-5.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
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On the one hand, DHS is not alone in the tendency to emphasize management 
over leadership. A naval officer survey conducted in 1988 collected data to determine 
how much time officers spent on management, technical skills, and leadership. The 
results were 42.31 percent on management, 28.78 percent technical, and 28.9 percent 
leadership.34 These results show that naval officers spend the majority of their time 
managing rather than leading. Since we know the Navy values leadership as one of its 
most important skills, the logical conclusion is that that the Navy, in 1988, was not 
tapping into its full leadership potential. During the next two decades, these results drove 
the Navy to develop more comprehensive institutional leadership development programs, 
which are discussed in the following chapters. 
The DOD is constantly revising its leadership programs to reflect current 
organizational and operational goals. For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara developed the systems analysis approach at Harvard and originally used it in 
the automotive industry.35 The problem with his method was that it was based on process 
improvement rather than leadership development, so in the late 1960s, the Navy 
discarded it as a method for teaching leadership. Following the systems analysis approach 
was Total Quality Leadership, then Principle Centered Leadership in the 1990s, and Lean 
Six Sigma in the 2000s.36 Many of these approaches enjoyed wide currency at the time in 
civilian industry. Indeed, DOD branches have borrowed effective methods from each 
other as well as from civilian organizations. 
This thesis illustrates that lack of a formal, institutionalized leadership program is 
causing a major negative impact within DHS. By using the DOD and the Navy as 
positive examples of how quality leadership training can impact organizations, it should 
no longer be accepted that DHS has developed no formal leadership training program and 
                                                 
34 Raymond Lewis, “Naval Leadership: A Study of Views on Leadership Competencies and Methods 
to Reinforce Leadership Skills” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1990), http://calhoun.nps.edu/
bitstream/handle/10945/27622/90Dec_Lewis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 38.  
35 Thomas, Leader Development in the U.S. Department of Defense, 4.  
36 Ibid., 5. 
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“focuses on large, high dollar programs and policies at the expense of organizational 
success.”37 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The subject of DHS leadership has been written about for many years. The 
purpose of this thesis is to motivate DHS to stop discussing and analyzing its leadership 
shortcomings and start making programs to correct its deficiencies. For too long DHS has 
relied on the excuses that the organization is too large and its component organizations 
too different to employ a comprehensive leadership program that is effective for every 
individual in every organization. Using the DOD as a model, DHS will see that large, 
complex organizations can have an effective leadership training program. 
My research for this thesis mainly consists of current readings that allow for 
accurate comparisons between the DOD and DHS in the 21st century. Also, the research 
covers at least one reading from each DOD branch to ensure that the DOD methodologies 
on leadership are not bias toward one branch or another. I also attempt to show as many 
similarities as possible between the two organizations to support the idea that DHS can 
adapt many techniques from the DOD into its organizations because they both operate 
using a common mission framework. 
 
 
                                                 
37 Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, 112th Cong., 1 (2012) (statement of Thad 
Allen).  
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II. HURRICANE KATRINA: A LEADERSHIP CASE STUDY 
Natural disasters are an unfortunate, but focused, way for DHS to test its training, 
policies, and procedures. Each response requires leadership at the highest levels, as well 
as on-the-spot leadership from those who find themselves in the wrong place at the right 
time. None of these leaders has the luxury of having a bad day of leading in these 
situations—so one might hope that the known or foreseeable barriers to effective 
leadership would be cleared through time, training, practice, and policy. Unfortunately, 
this aspiration remains out of reach, particularly for DHS leaders. 
Typically, Hurricane Katrina figures prominently in accounts of how DHS 
leadership has failed. In fact, Hurricane Katrina is an excellent case study to show that 
even if DHS was run brilliantly at all times, it would still not have a 100  percent success 
rate. In the following chapter, I show how internal and external barriers, including 
legalities, organizational structure, interagency coordination, congressional barriers, and 
the disasters themselves, provide challenges for all leaders within DHS. In later chapters, 
I discuss how institutional leadership training could have prevented many of the 
response, coordination, and procedural problems that are still present in DHS today. 
A. DISASTER MANAGEMENT—HURRICANE KATRINA 
The greatest external factor that created barriers to leadership and management 
was Hurricane Katrina itself. Even though it was one of the most accurately predicted 
hurricanes in history, the damage of this 2005 hurricane was catastrophic. Estimates run 
as high as $100 billion  in property damage, 300,000 homes lost, 118 million cubic yards 
of debris, and 1,330 deaths.38 
Hurricane Katrina was the first event to expose major weaknesses within DHS, 
which had been around for about two years at the time. Subsequently, several reports 
were compiled to investigate the shortcomings of DHS during its response effort. One of 
                                                 
38 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/katrina/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf, 
7–8. 
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these reports, by Frances Fragos Townsend, identifies 17 critical challenges with which 
DHS and other responders dealt with.39 This section examines several of these 
challenges, placing an emphasis on national preparedness, communications, logistics and 
evacuations, training and exercises, legalities, and lessons learned. Furthermore, this 
summary of events analyzes the effects of poor management on an individual’s ability to 
lead. 
1. Preparedness—What’s in a Name? 
One major impediment to effective leadership at DHS is the lack of clarity of one 
of its five key missions, preparedness. Preparedness was the second greatest external 
factor affecting DHS’s leadership response. Preparedness, like leadership, is somewhat of 
an abstract term, depending on who is using it. DHS and FEMA have defined 
preparedness as:  
a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, 
exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure 
effective coordination during incident response. This cycle is one element 
of a broader National Preparedness System to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other disasters.40 
DHS’s ability to prepare is regulated by constitutional authority that allows 
individual states to handle disasters in a manner they see fit, until the point at which they 
can no longer handle the situation without federal support.41 This structure, mandated 
under current legislation known as the Stafford Act, can affect leaders within DHS 
because their hands are tied until the state requests permission for help. Examples of this 
are not limited to Hurricane Katrina but also present in other environmental disasters, 
such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. A 2015 report from North Carolina State 
University states:  
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was accompanied by intergovernmental 
blame casting and criticisms similar to that of Hurricane Katrina. The 
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41 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 11. 
 13
federal response was often viewed as slow, state officials were unsure of 
their role, and local officials complained that they were not adequately 
consulted.42  
Failure of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide coordination 
between federal and local authorities before, during, and after these events is a prime 
example of how a federalist system, structured by law, can create barriers rather than 
removing them. 
As DHS continues to develop its leadership programs, it must include training on 
the chain of command. Specifically, DHS must emphasize the fact that chain of 
command is not only based on rank but also on situational authority. Hurricane Katrina 
response efforts were made more difficult by the fact that leaders did not define a clear 
chain of command throughout the interagency disaster management process. Although 
not every situation can be covered in a joint publication, individuals at various levels of 
responsibility should always know who is in charge when entities other than DHS are 
involved. DHS employees face ambiguity in day-to-day operations that must be 
overcome in a timely manner by leaders who have been trained to know their roll in 
various stages during the development of an operation. 
2. Organizational Structure 
DHS either has too much or too little leadership, depending on how an observer 
perceives its structure. Either way, the organization itself represents a barrier to 
leadership. DHS was created in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. On March 
3, 2003, DHS merged 22 departments and nearly 200,000 people to create one of the 
biggest federal agencies in history.43 The Office of Personnel Management states:  
As of September 2013, Department of Veteran Affairs has 337,683 (16.3 
percent) federal employees in pay status; Department of Army has 
261,029 (12.6 percent) federal employees; Department of Navy has 
194,301 (9.4 percent) federal employees; Department of Homeland 
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Security has 193,867 (9.4 percent) federal employees; and Department of 
Air Force has 167,439 (8.1 percent) federal employees.44  
Although these numbers were a bit different at the time of the disaster, one can see just 
how large DHS is. 
DHS had several interagency coordination problems that could have been solved 
by cross-training prior to the storm. FEMA in particular was a victim of its inability to 
coordinate with various agencies. A performance review by the Office of Inspector 
General explains that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross created more 
confusion because the organizations “experienced difficulty in identifying the number 
and location of evacuees because both held different expectations for coordinating the 
mass care function.”45 FEMA also experienced difficulties with its role as Emergency 
Support Function (ESF)-9, urban search and rescue coordinator. Many of the rescue 
efforts provided by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), DOD, National Guard, and emergency 
management assistance compacts (EMACs) were not coordinated by FEMA due to its 
inability to handle the number of assets available.46 Also, the ESF-15 function, which 
provides coordination of information to all authorities during the event, suffered a near 
collapse as communication infrastructure failed, and personnel experienced confusion as 
to who was in charge of providing information to different levels of authority.47 Incidents 
like these can be prevented in the future by establishing a leadership hierarchy in 
conjunction with National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-5. 
3. National Security Presidential Directive-5 
Homeland security operations are directed by Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD)-5. The HSPDs are modified by presidential directives, which contain 
                                                 
44 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Frequently Asked Questions: Workforce Information,” 
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46 Ibid., 55. 
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policy, tasking, and technical/conforming amendments to HSPDs-1/2/3.48 HSPD-5 
directs federal authorities as to how they should interact with local governments. Of 
course, this document and its plans are extremely important to the mission of DHS, but it 
does create difficulties. 
For example, local authorities train together every day and have their own policies 
and procedures regarding various response efforts. These methods may or may not be the 
same throughout the state. Even if they are, organizations will naturally do things a little 
bit differently than their counterparts. These differences create an opportunity for cross-
training to take place, which is a valuable tool that DHS addressed in its employee 
training plan published in 2004.49 However, cross-training requires funding, manpower, 
and time, and the state might not have an excess of any of these. When considering that 
HSPD-5 directs federal authorities to develop a game plan for how they will coordinate in 
the event of a disaster requiring federal assistance, one can see the scope of that task. The 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned identified that interagency red 
tape caused many delays that hindered the effectiveness of response efforts. It states, “We 
must transform our approach for catastrophic incidents from one of bureaucratic 
coordination to proactive unified command that creates true unity effort.50 
B. CONGRESSIONAL BARRIERS 
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission expressed concern about too much congressional 
oversight presiding over our national security. At the time, the number of homeland 
security related committees and subcommittees numbered 86. The complexity of DHS 
oversight is illustrated in Figure 2.51 In 2010, the deputy director of DHS was asked 
about congressional oversight, and she stated the agency reported to 108 committees and 
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subcommittees.52 Peter King, the highest-ranking republican on the House Committee on 
Homeland Security, says about the oversight, “It just becomes a minefield and also a 
tremendous source of delay, time and confusion for the Department of Homeland 
Security.”53 Furthermore, senior leaders within DHS find themselves reporting to 
committee after committee, each of which provides various direction for the department. 
The only problem is, as stated by Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS from 2005–2009, 
“the direction you get from the committees tends to be inconsistent.”54 
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Figure 2.  DHS Oversight Complexity55 
 
And there is a lot of direction to DHS. Due to politics, jurisdiction issues, and 
funding, all of the congressional oversight the several component organizations and 
functions brought to the merger that became DHS has persisted with little or no 
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streamlining, deconflicting, or blending. Rather, everyone wants to keep control over 
their portions within the organizational structure that is overseen by the committees on 
homeland security.56 As a result, DHS is constantly expending efforts increasing 
administrative processes when those efforts could be going to protecting the nation. 
Political scientists speculate that political reasons for not wanting to give up 
committee oversight range from elevated campaign credentials to not wanting to be cut 
out of the “inner circle.”57 As a comparison for DHS oversight, Senator Joseph 
Lieberman looked at the Department of Defense and how it runs its program. He said this 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee: “It oversees the entire Department of Defense, 
which has a budget, oh probably 15 times the size of the DHS budget. So this is 
doable.”58 
On the other hand, research from Vanderbilt University on congressional 
oversight shows a different view. It found that,  
increasing the number of committees with access to an agency may 
simultaneously increase the ability of members to secure electorally 
valuable private goods for their constituents but undermine the ability of 
Congress as an institution to respond collectively to the actions of the 
presidency or the bureaucracy.59  
The report further concludes:  
Members overly focused on securing district resources such as homeland 
security grants, visas for constituents, and disaster relief from the 
department may be unwilling or unable to focus on the larger policy goals. 
The ability and incentive of members of Congress to secure private goods 
for their district does not imply that a similar ability and incentive exists 
when dealing with the provision of public goods and the more diffuse 
policy goals.60  
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Simply put, many members of these DHS oversight committees are more interested in 
what they can procure for the benefit of their constituents rather than the overall 
functionality of DHS and the security of the nation. 
The journal article “Crisis Bureaucracy” describes how congressional politics 
rewrote the president’s initial Homeland Security Act to “serve the interest of its 
members; that is to conform with the political-bureaucratic system.”61 The act was re-
constructed to create inconsistences that allow the bureaucratic machine to keep 
churning, which in turn keeps the money flowing. The authors cite examples of how the 
Homeland Security Act was re-written to become a revolving door of government 
spending:  
goal distortion and the distributive tendency; multiple veto points forcing 
alterations in the legislation; intra-congressional committee jurisdictional 
issues; electoral goals of the majority party against the minority party; 
uncertainty about the reorganization; and the role of the crisis.62  
C. FUNDING: A $30 BILLION BARRIER? 
While the influence of politicians over government programs is undeniable, there 
is quantitative evidence to dispute the claims that elected officials are placing grant 
funding over fighting terrorism. The assertion that DHS grant money is being spent too 
haphazardly comes from the fact that smaller states, with less probability of an attack, 
have received more per capita grant dollars than other, more densely populated states.63 
Therefore, the issue is not the grants but rather the allocation of them. Originally, states 
were paid grant money a base level of funding, and the rest was distributed in direct 
proportion to a state’s population.64 This distribution was deemed inefficient because it 
did not incorporate risk-level analysis to fund distribution. As a result in 2006, the 
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Department of Homeland Security Appropriation changed the way funding was 
distributed by incorporating risk analysis into distribution. 
A study reported in the Policy Studies Journal analyzed four grant programs: 
State Homeland Security Grant Program, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Citizens Corps Program.65 The authors 
used mathematical formulas to determine if elected officials were concerned with 
external threats or special interest when it comes to procuring grant funding. The 
researchers, Prante and Bohara, do admit that applying a risk level to the model is 
somewhat difficult because quantifying a risk value based on future terrorist attacks is by 
no means an exact science. The results of their analysis indicate that states with a higher 
level of risk do receive more money. Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with the 
notions that DHS grants are considered pork-barrel spending and that congressional 
influence is not a positive factor when it comes to the procurement of state funding.66 
Since the study was conducted 10 years ago, one most note the data indicates that 
influence of terrorism risk had less effect on 2006 grant allotment than in 2005 and 2004. 
This point is significant because it shows a trend that as the threat environment of 2001–
2002 recedes, the influence of terrorism risk may have less and less impact on how DHS 
grants are distributed. The conclusions of Prante and Bohara’s analysis states:  
we find evidence that the risk of terrorist attack is a positive and 
statistically significant determinant of funding. In contrast, political 
factors, from the perspective of both party affiliation and congressional 
influence are not found to positively influence funding outcomes.67 
D. THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
There are several examples of success, predicated on rules and regulations, during 
Hurricane Katrina from pre-landfall to reconstruction. Examples of effective coordination 
between federal authorities and local authorities include: 
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 Activation of FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team, which coordinates with 
state and local authorities.68 
 More than 1,000 truckloads of ice and water to five states pre-landfall.69 
 Mobilization of the National Guard.70 
 Daily video teleconferences between FEMA and disaster support first 
responders.71 
 Department of Transportation (DOT) established contraflow efforts, and 
coordinated with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for rapid 
evacuation.72 
 Activation of the National Disaster Medical System, disaster medical 
assistance teams, and urban search and rescue.73 
 Throughout the region there were pre-staged over 3.7 million liters of 
water, 4.6 million pounds of ice—with 13 million additional pounds of ice 
in cold storage ready to be deployed—and over 1.86 million meals ready 
to eat (MREs). Another 2.1 million MREs were positioned in logistics 
centers outside the region ready to be distributed.74 
 
Pre-landfall efforts no doubt saved many lives, but the complexity of interagency 
communications and coordination created barriers to pre-landfall management, rather 
than promoting streamline operations. Even though Katrina was still 12 hours from 
landfall at the time, contraflow operations were shortened due to the effects of the 
hurricane, and the time it took to start the contraflow process.75 Similarly, the FAA’s 
plans to keep airspace open were shortened due to pre-landfall winds. 
                                                 
68 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 22. 
69 Ibid., 23. 
70 Ibid., 24. 
71 Ibid., 25. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 27. 
74 Ibid., 31. 
75 Ibid., 29. 
 22
E. KATRINA LESSONS LEARNED 
It was not until September 6, 2005, when DHS and the DOJ established the Law 
Enforcement Coordination Center, that the situation appeared to be under control. The 
unified command allowed all agencies involved in the recovery and reconstruction process 
to feed their information to a centralized authority that could then disseminate it through 
the chain of command and make sure that certain processes were not duplicated and that 
other processes were not forgotten. 
Still, there were operations, such as body recovery, that had not been planned for 
properly. FEMA took the lead by deploying disaster mortuary operational response teams 
and disaster portable morgue units to the area. An agreement was in the works with a 
civilian company (Kenyon International) to retrieve and transport the bodies, but the 
agreement fell through, leaving DOD temporarily in charge. Until the end, state and federal 
authorities disagreed on whose responsibility it was to take care of the deceased. Louisiana 
Senator Blanco accused FEMA of being unable to bypass bureaucratic red tape in its effort 
to finalize the contract with Kenyon International for body removal.76 
Ultimately, the overall federal response to the disaster was deemed a “failure of 
leadership.”77 The data indicates that leaders within DHS faced numerous barriers, which 
made effective leadership near impossible. However, DHS cannot place all the blame on 
barriers, and it must recognize that several preparedness problems, stemming from lack of 
training, were under investigation prior to the storm. A 2004 DHS training plan reported:  
DHS managers and staff have expressed concerns about the effectiveness of 
existing training courses, lack of access to training, confusion about what 
training was available, lack of resources to meet unmet needs and a lack of 
coordination among the department’s training resources.78  
This reality is very important because it identifies that even if DHS had an effective 
leadership program, which it did not, DHS still did not have the means to distribute the 
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training to its employees. The DHS Employee Training Plan report took a broad view of 
the training requirements and found extreme lack of oversight, unity, and accountability. 
Additionally, the report found that the Leadership Learning Council, which is in charge of 
training in each division, lacked the authority to make changes to training programs that 
were ineffective or mismanaged.79 Moreover, the report also found that training focused 
mainly on non-operational topics, such as welfare programs and health services, and had no 
formal training programs in operational management or leadership.80 Lastly, the report 
summarized six key findings showing the lack of training DHS employees were receiving:  
 
 There is no overall agency training plan addressing enterprise-wide training 
needs, nor standards for training design, delivery, or evaluation.81 
 There is no comprehensive training plan for department-wide shared 
services (AS, FPA, DO).82 
 There is no overall strategy to adopt a learning system that blends classroom 
training with distance learning methods.83 
 There is no overall assessment of the investment in training resources and 
the resulting outcomes.84 
 Training equipment is dispersed throughout DHS with no central 
coordination. 
 There has been a recent reduction in available classrooms with no 
offsetting.  
 
In summary, DHS was facing major training deficiencies less than a year prior to 
the storm, and it paid the price for not giving adequate attention to its training deficiencies. 
Unfortunately, the same problems remain visible today. Later chapters discuss how the 
DOD is providing leadership training and offer various solutions as to how DHS can 
deliver these programs. 
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III. POST-KATRINA EXECUTIVE ORDER 13434 AND NSPD 
Unfortunately, great strides in leadership training and education do not seem to 
occur until an accident happens or an incident demonstrates leadership failure. At that 
point, programs are developed rapidly, and sometimes the programs, implemented in 
such haste, are not focused on the root of the problem. DHS has made a lot of positive 
changes since Hurricane Katrina, but the changes have been slow, costly, and sometimes 
ineffective. This chapter examines the beginning stages of formal leadership and 
education programs for DHS personnel and concludes by observing data indicating either 
the programs are working or they need much greater attention.  
After Hurricane Katrina, it became clear that DHS needed a dedicated leadership 
and professional development program. The result was Executive Order 13434, 
established May 17, 2007, which called for “establishment of a National Security 
Professional Development (NSPD) program for seventeen federal agencies resting on 
three pillars: education, training, and professional experience.”85 The following account 
of the development of this program is a prime example of how bureaucracies create 
barriers to leadership—even as the agency is trying to create a leadership program. 
Oversight of the National Security Professional Development Program was given 
to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director Linda Springer, who reported to 
Frances Townsend and the national security advisor.86 The oversight committee, known 
as the senior level Executive Steering Committee (ESC), released the National Strategy 
for the Development of National Security Professionals in July, which “decentralized 
implementation of the program to the seventeen agencies, reflecting OPM’s reluctance to 
move beyond guidance into oversight.”87 Later the same year, just as OPM released the 
initial NSPD development plan, Clay Johnson became chair of the ESC. The NSPD 
Program had only been online for half a year, and the program was already getting a new 
boss just as the first NSPD implementations plan had been created. According to Morton, 
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Johnson was “[a] longtime friend of the president. Johnson was George Bush’s college 
roommate, his chief of staff as Texas governor, and manager of his presidential transition 
team.”88 Johnson was also the former Office of Management and Budget director, which 
theoretically gave him the qualifications to oversee the NSPD Program.89  
With the inception of Executive Order (EO) 13434, a second group, known as the 
National Security Professional Development Integration Office (NSPD-IO), was formed 
to assist the ESC.90 Major General William A. Navas, retired Army National Guard, was 
put in charge of NSPD-IO. According to the chain of command, NSPD-IO had absolutely 
no authority over the NSPD Program; its only job was to “support the ESC and 
coordinate and monitor NSPD implementation.”91 Navas served as the assistant secretary 
for manpower and reserve affairs while serving in the Army Guard, which qualified him 
for the job.92 However, it is interesting that someone in the DOD was hired for the job, 
which in turn gave DHS access to DOD funds. 
In 2008, the program was starting to take shape as senior executive national 
security professionals began taking online courses provided by FEMA, and all national 
security professionals (NSPs) participated in e-learning on national security. At first 
glance, it may seem odd that senior executives in any department involved in national 
security would need an online refresher on national security. In 2009, with a new 
president in the White House and a new administration moving into place, the NSPD 
Program was put on hold. The program had no legislative mandate so the new 
administration viewed it as the previous administration’s brain child. In 2010, the DOD 
transferred authority of NSPD-IO to the Executive Office of the President, and another 
committee was formed under the National Security Council (NSC), known as the 
Interagency Policy Committee.93 The committee was run by NSC senior advisor Mary 
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Yates.94 One of the main reasons NSPD was developed was to solve interagency issues, 
but as Morton states, “despite interagency efforts in 2009 and 2010, the NSPD program 
remained in strategic pause until early 2011.”95 In February 2011, almost four years after 
EO 13434 and the implementation of NSPD, another NSC senior director took over the 
program and started NSPD 2.0.  
In November 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report 
titled National Security: An Overview of Professional Development Activities Intended to 
Improve Interagency Collaboration.96 The purpose of the report was to identify gaps in 
knowledge, skills, training, and professional development of national security staff. The 
report states:  
Recently, two studies have been launched to reexamine NSPD and to take 
a more comprehensive look at the skills, education, training, and 
professional experiences that interagency national security professionals 
need at various career stages. While awaiting the results of these studies, 
the NSPD executive staff is reviewing issues related to the scope and 
definition of national security professionals and revising the NSPD 
strategy and implementation plan. Several agencies reported putting 
implementation of their NSPD-related training and professional 
development activities on hold pending the results of these reviews, or 
other direction from the administration. In addition, the online repository 
of information is no longer available.97  
 
This analysis appears to indicate much ambiguity within the NSPD program, but 
somehow also it drew the conclusion that DHS met most of the professional development 
criteria set by the GAO through short-term online or classroom courses.98 It appears that 
the lack of standardization of the NSPD program allowed it to pass the GAO 
investigation of it because the GAO had no idea what it was looking for.  
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A. EFFECTIVE LEARNING INTERVENTIONS FOR DEVELOPING 
EXECUTIVE CORE QUALIFICATIONS 
In 2011, the NSPD-IO was transferred to OPM. According to the agency’s 
website, DHS “offers a variety of training opportunities to employees, including 
academic programs, leader development, career development, mandatory training, 
professional development and technical skills training,” and its leadership development 
program “helps ensure that leaders at all levels throughout the department are exposed to 
a core set of developmental experiences and leadership principles.”99  
Once NSPD was in the hands of OPM, leadership development programs were 
beginning to be recognized as critical tools that could enhance the federal government’s 
capacity to provide security for the nation. OPM partnered with George Mason 
University to review leadership development efforts to provide enhanced methods of 
leadership training that would develop at the same rate as the growing threats to our 
nation. The four objectives identified in the report were:  
 
 To help agencies make strategic data driven training decisions. 
 To promote increased efficiencies by informing the design, development 
and implementation of new leadership development programs with 
theoretically grounded research. 
 To increase training innovation, rigor, and effectiveness within federal 
leadership development programs. 
 To provide a helpful data-driven approach for evaluating the potential 
effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf development solutions offered 
by external vendors.100  
 
The report concluded that leadership development comes from various learning 
experiences and leadership training effectiveness varies by individual and the type of 
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instruction used.101 The report included a leadership development matrix, which can be 
used by individuals on a daily basis, consisting of five effective learning interventions for 
developing executive core qualifications (EQCs) that coincide with 22 core leadership 
areas and six fundamental areas. These leadership areas are covered in the Senior 
Executive Service Candidate Program, which is for GS-15 level employees. The course 
runs 12–18 months and focuses on developing EQCs, strengthening leadership 
competencies, and cross-department exposure.102 The program identifies EQC 
competency gaps, provides 80 hours of classroom training through American University, 
provides candidates with a mentor, and includes extracurricular developmental activities 
to increase student understanding of the DHS’s mission.103  
The course is only a few years old, but it is a step in the right direction. Realizing 
there is a leadership development problem is the first step toward fixing it. In 2011, DHS 
Chief of Human Capital Officer Jeff Neil stated, “We tend to pick people because they 
were good doers…We make them leaders, but we don’t always develop them.”104 This 
statement is the crux of the leadership development argument. Are organizations training 
personnel in leadership positions to become better leaders, or are they hoping that by the 
time individuals find themselves in a position of leadership they will have the tools and 
experience to get the job done? 
B. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DATA 
It should come as no surprise that if there are no programs teaching personnel 
how to lead, the quality of leadership within an organization may be lower than desired. 
One metric of DHS employees’ views on leadership within their organization is the 
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. After all, there is no point addressing the 
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significance of leadership problem if there is not one in the first place. The Federal 
Employee Viewpoint Survey is just one of the ways that “agency leaders can help this 
(federal) dedicated workforce to continue to provide excellent service to the American 
people each and every day.”105  
Conducted by the OPM, the survey is a “tool that measures employee’s 
perceptions of whether, and to what extent, conditions that characterize successful 
organizations are present in their agencies.”106 The survey has been conducted since 
2004, the same year that the DHS Employee Training Plan was published. It is taken by 
non-supervisors, supervisors, and executive employees, and their responses are further 
broken down into fulltime, part-time, and non-seasoned employees.107 After the survey 
was completed by 392,752 personnel, it was concluded that there were “declines related 
to the performance of senior leaders and managers.”108 For each survey given, there are 
specific items related directly to leadership.109  
Table 1 shows percentage differences in positive responses from 2012 to 2015 
with an arrow indicating the trend direction from the previous year. Trend arrows from 
2014/2015 are deceiving as they only indicate minor increases form the previous year, 
but after a closer look, it turns out that all categories are lower over the four-year span.110 
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Table 1.   OPM Leadership Specific Questions, Items 53–62111 
Question 















(53) In my organization, leaders 
generate high levels of motivation 
and commitment in the workforce. 
42.9% 40.8% 37.5% 39.0%
   
(54) My organization’s leaders 
maintain high standards of honesty 
and integrity. 
55.1% 53.6% 49.5% 50.4%
   
(55) Supervisors work well with 
employees of different backgrounds. 63.4% 62.8% 63.1% 62.9%      
(56) Managers communicate the 
goals and priorities of the 
organization. 
62.4% 61.2% 58.2% 59.1%
   
(57) Managers review and evaluate 
the organization’s progress toward 
meeting its goals and objectives. 
62.0% 60.7% 58.0% 58.8%
   
(58) Managers promote 
communication among different work 
units (for example, about projects, 
goals, needed resources). 
53.3% 52.3% 49.9% 50.5%
   
(59) Managers support collaboration 
across work units to accomplish work 
objectives. 
56.9% 56.1% 53.5% 54.2%
   
(60) Overall, how good a job do you 
feel is being done by the manager 
directly above your immediate 
supervisor? 
57.9% 57.0% 56.0% 56.8%
   
(61) I have a high level of respect for 
my organization’s senior leaders. 54.1% 52.3% 50.1% 51.4%    
(62) Senior leaders demonstrate 
support for work/life programs. 54.0% 53.7% 52.3% 53.4%    
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These survey results are not the sole evidence of a leadership problem at DHS. 
For example, the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework used four 
metrics to analyze how DHS compared to 38 other agencies in the areas listed as follows 
and ranked them in order. DHS scored last, or next to last, in each of the four 
categories.112  
 
1. Leadership and management—next to last  
2. Results-oriented performance culture—last  
3. Talent management—next to last  
4. Job satisfaction—last113  
 
All these leadership issues are causing real problems for DHS. Overall employee 
satisfaction rates for the department are at the lowest point since the agency’s inception. 
As stated by the Washington Times, “Homeland Security was one of the Worst Overall, 
continuing a downward trend that’s seen its satisfaction rate drop from 62 percent in 2010 
to 47 percent now, or 5 percentage points below the next worse.”114 Thus, it seems safe 
to conclude that DHS leadership training programs need much more work. NSPD 
programs need to be available for all personnel, not just the Senior Executive Service. 
Furthermore, the delivery system of such leadership and training tools must be adequate 
so all personnel can access them at any time, as well as be trackable instead of relying on 
the self-reporting system. While it is impossible to conclude that perception of leadership 
failure in an organization is an actual leadership failure, the data that indicate DHS 
leadership has reached an all-time low over the past decade is enough to determine that in 
this case; perception is the reality.  
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IV. HISTORY OF U.S. NAVY LEADERSHIP TRAINING 
Similar to DHS, the Navy did not get serious about implementing leadership 
training and education programs until a major incident occurred. This chapter shows 
similarities between the development of the U.S. Navy’s leadership training programs 
and DHS’s attempts at developing one. It also provides examples of leadership training 
development techniques that DHS can adopt. By showing the Navy’s leadership training 
progression from a lean management process to a more developed human resources 
approach to leadership training, DHS can examine the pros and cons of the Navy’s 
leadership training history to develop a program that is best suited for DHS.  
In 1972, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Constellation experienced riots that the 
media portrayed as race-related. However, the underlying cause was actually senior 
leadership’s inability to control ship demonstrations protesting the Vietnam War.115 In an 
attempt to understand what went wrong, Congress in 1973 undertook a study, which 
concluded:  
One of the most alarming features of the investigation was the discovery 
of lack of leadership by middle management in the Navy. It became 
apparent that while junior officers, chief petty officers and senior petty 
officers were performing their technical duties in a proficient manner, 
there was a lack of leadership in dealing with the seamen.116  
The study led to the development of the Navy’s Leadership and Management 
Training courses, which were separated into more than 150 sub-courses—with no real 
oversight.117 The programs were described as having no “standardized curriculum, no 
attendance requirements, and generally consisted of lecture-format delivery of Navy 
tradition, rules, and regulations, combined with selected (non-standardized) management 
theory.”118  
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For the next three decades the Navy attempted to form effective leadership 
training through various programs, including Leadership Management Training, 
Leadership Management Education and Training, and the Navy Leader Development 
Program.119 Each program was incrementally better than the last as training methods 
were based on “extensive data collection and analysis on the skills, behaviors and 
performance of successful Sailors in various roles.”120 These competencies continued to 
evolve as the Navy searched for more effective ways to predict job performance. At the 
same time, the leadership program length was adjusted from two weeks to ten days, 
readjusted to nine days, and finally shortened to five days.121 In 2009, the program was 
shortened again to three days, and the majority of training responsibility was turned over 
to the parent command, rather than being held in a formal training classroom.122  
Almost 40 years after implementing a formal training model, the Navy has come 
full circle: the lack of updated, effective, leadership education and training is contributing 
to commanding officers being fired at a rate never seen before; incidents are carried out 
by sailors abroad causing high visibility international relation problems; and a growing 
erosion of distrust between subordinates and senior leaders is increasing negative impacts 
throughout the fleet, including poor retention rates.123 A white paper written by Captain 
Mark F. Light expressed concerned over the systemic problem of senior leaders being 
fired for personal misconduct.124 One of the many conclusions presented by Light was 
that the “absence of training for all officers to a set standard has led to a failure of 
leadership.”125 Although the Navy is effective at distributing training material to its 
personnel, it lacks proper leadership training modules for sailors at all levels.126 This 
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situation creates a gap, similar to EQC gaps identified by DHS, wherein individuals are 
able to decide what type of organizational training applies to them because the 
organization has failed to provide standardized leadership training.  
In 2015, the Center for Personal and Professional Development (CCPD) collected 
data from 2500 sailors to assess the current state of Navy leadership training.127 Its 
analysis found several negative impacts attributed to current training including quality, 
length, poor instruction, and lack of preparation.128 The data collected came from four 
sources:  
 
1. End of course student critiques  
2. Task-type work time  
3. Fleet assessment of Leadership Competencies  
4. Focus Groups.129  
 
The results concluded, “the Fleet considers the current training preparation for 
technical, managerial and leadership roles as inadequate.”130 Scores for end-of-course 
surveys fell below the Center for Personal and Professional Development standards, and 
the shift in leadership responsibilities among the ranks has gone almost unnoticed by the 
command structure. Survey respondents showed strong concern regarding training that is 
conducted at the command level, and the majority endorsed the idea of returning 
leadership training to the schoolhouse. Furthermore, respondents also noted training at 
the command level is easily interrupted as instructors are distracted by work priorities 
and operational tempo, which results in inadequate training.  
The CCPD findings of the survey are summarized through six key issues:  
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1. Management and leadership responsibilities lie more heavily on the 
higher-ranking officers and petty officers than in the past. 
2. Leadership objectives set by the chief of naval operations (CNO) are not 
being met. 
3. Leadership training programs are so short that instructors are unable to fit 
all the necessary content within time constraints. 
4. Naval leadership values are not being taught at the command level on a 
routine basis. 
5. Command training is sometimes hindered by the fact that personnel do not 
want to interact with their superiors on issues regarding leadership in fear 
that they might say the wrong things. 
6. The mentorship program in the Navy is underutilized and often thought of 
as just another requirement.131  
 
The CCPD’s findings validate issues that have largely been ignored. Management 
and leadership responsibilities have fallen on the shoulders of the select few who are 
fortunate enough to make it through the career gauntlet with only minor infractions. Once 
at the top, senior leaders realize that everything they worked for could be lost if too many 
mistakes are made by their subordinates. This mindset has created the Navy’s current 
risk-averse culture and zero-defects standards, resulting in bosses’ micro managing and 
not allowing sailors to learn on the job by making mistakes in non-combat environments. 
Junior sailors end up being less than adequately trained, which results in either more 
mistakes or their inability to complete tasks on their own, therefore shifting more 
responsibility to their superiors.  
As leadership training continues to decrease in quality, length, and overall scope, 
the Navy has shifted its focus to other modes and media for training.132 Command-based 
training and computer-based training are perceived as cost beneficial and a great way for 
commands to schedule training around operations, but the results show that command 
leadership training is ineffective due to a myriad of factors, including: “funding 
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reductions, expanding mission tasking, growing operational threats from international 
terrorist organizations, manning level and billet instability, promotion and career 
longevity uncertainty, modifications to technical training content and duration, etc.”133 
The CPPD’s recommendations include updating the training programs for senior 
petty officers, evaluating and revising the FITREP and evaluation system, determining the 
cost of moving leadership training back to training commands, and evaluating command 
climate issues that are barriers to leadership goals.134 The Center for Naval Leadership 
(CNL), previously based in Dam Neck Virginia, now known as the Naval Leadership and 
Ethics Center in Newport Rhode Island, has come to the conclusion that the Navy’s 
blending learning solutions are the optimum method for training delivery. In addition, a 
CNL report cites the Chief Petty Officer Selectee Program as a prime example of a blended 
learning solution success.135 
After releasing its results, the CPPD, along with other leadership training 
elements, has since been shut down. During their time of disestablishment, at least five 
leadership training courses were put in either a hold status pending review or 
cancellation.136 Does this development mean the research the CPPD conducted is invalid, 
or is the information it collected not what the bosses wanted to hear? 
A. IDENTIFYING LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES 
A similar study to the CNL study, titled Naval Leadership Training Study, was 
conducted in 2007 by the Human Performance Center (HPC) with the CNL. It concluded, 
“continued analysis and evaluation of established processes in the Leadership Development 
Continuum and examination of how they benchmark with current and future processes 
offered by other military branches and those within the civilian sector.”137 The first goal 
was to discover how different branches within the DOD provided leadership training and 
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which methods were most effective. The second goal was to identify whether quality of 
training was more effective at institutional sites, such as the Center for Naval Leadership, 
or through other methods, such as command delivered training, blended learning solutions, 
and electronic-based training.138  
CNL bases all of its leadership training on its naval leadership competency model 
(NLCM). The model was built through a collective effort of six different agencies 
involved in creating leadership training material.139 The agencies are made up of system 
matter experts, who can deliver current and comprehensive knowledge of what is 
happening in the fleet. These individuals include top-notch sailors, hand selected from 
“Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Learning Centers within the NPDC 
domain, Naval Service Training Command (NSTC), NPDC, and NETC Instructional 
System Specialists (ISS).”140 The model is used to ensure that all sailors achieve specific 
leadership training at key points in their career, points which are determined by fleet 
requirements. Essentially, the NLCM is the link that ties the needs of the fleet to what 
sailors are being taught. See Figures 3 and 4.  
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Figure 3.  Fleet Requirements of Enlisted Sailors141 
 
Figure 4.  Fleet Requirements for Officers142 
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B. NAVY LEADERSHIP COMPETENCY MODEL 
Naval leadership hypothesized that by basing leadership training off the NLCM 
(see Figure 5), leadership performance could be measured. The first sign it was working 
was the development of a new chief petty officer (CPO) transition program. This 
programed marked the first time the CPO transition program had been updated in 15 
years.143 Previously known as Chief’s Initiation, past elements of the transition process 
from first class petty officer to chief petty officer were tightly held. In keeping with Navy 
tradition, some of these elements are still held secret. Now however, with new 
coursework, updated training instructions, and formal classroom teachings, the new CPO 
mess can to carry out leadership directives from the CNO while maintaining its “Goat 
Locker” traditions. Initiation events, such as cross-dressing, diaper-wearing, sleep 
deprivation, and drinking the grog, have all but been abolished and replaced with a more 
professional selection process, including dropping the term “initiation” from the 
process.144 During this time, the division officer and department head leadership courses 
were also updated.145  
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Figure 5.  Naval Leadership Competency Model146  
 
C. EMPHASIS ON E-LEARNING 
Around the same time the Navy was implementing new alternatives to leadership 
training, the Marines, Army, Air Force, and the Coast Guard were using distance learning 
to teach leadership. Although each branch was using its own combination of training 
methods, all services were using e-learning as “the foremost-utilized distance learning 
tool across the services and is used primarily as an independent self-improvement 
instrument.”147 The Army’s Distributed Learning program consists of over 2,500 courses, 
a few hundred of which are for leadership and management training.148 The Air Force, 
similar to the Navy, has an Intranet application that allows airmen to navigate a wide 
variety of training, including programs from Ivy League colleges, NETg, SkillSoft, and 
other government applications.149  
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The DOD has convinced itself that not only is electronic distance learning one of 
the most valuable tools for its personnel, but it is very cost effective for the amount of 
training that can be conducted. Although e-learning has proven to be cost effective, the 
HPC report does not advocate e-learning as the most effective means of leadership 
training. A 2007 report cites a study conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), which found that classroom training outranked all other forms of 
training. The MIT study further concluded, “The ability to ask questions with the 
capability of receiving accurate feedback and collaborative learning were viewed as key 
components” for the student learning process.150  
Furthermore, the idea that command delivered training is more cost beneficial is 
true only on case-by-case basis. A preliminary cost evaluation between command 
delivered training (CDT) and training conducted in the more formal schoolhouse showed 
CDT was $10,889,322 more expensive, which is approximately double the cost than in 
schoolhouse training.151  
D. MENTORSHIP 
Data from the 2014 Navy retention survey shows that mentorship programs are 
highly underrated—and underutilized. The survey states, “Despite the recognized 
importance of having a mentor shepherd a service member through their respective career 
paths, 42.8% of Sailors report they do not have a mentor outside of any formal 
assignments.”152 The survey also shows that both the aviation and surface community, 
49.3 percent and 54.6 percent respectively, responded that they rely on a mentor over 
their commanding officer, executive officer, department head, and detailer for advice 
regarding their careers (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.   Aviation and  Surface Warfare153 
 
 
It is difficult to determine if mentorship programs are successful in services like 
the Army and Marines, which do not have formal mentorship programs. Instead, 
command officers in these branches informally counsel interested subordinates to find a 
mentor. On the other hand, the Air Force and Coast Guard both have policy directives 
mandating a formal mentor program. The Air Force’s directive 36–3401 states, 
“Commanders are responsible for promoting a robust mentoring program within their 
unit. The immediate supervisor or rater is designated as the primary mentor (coach, 
guide, role model, etc.) for each of his or her subordinates.”154 The USCG policy 
outlined in COM5350.24C is less defined and states that individuals should participate in 
mentorship programs, but ultimately it is up to individuals to take care of their personal 
and professional development.155  
E. NAVY EMPLOYEE SURVEY DATA  
The Navy conducts personnel surveys similar to those of OPM. Analysis of sailor 
responses can be used to displays similarities between how DHS employees and sailors 
feel about the current state organizational leadership.  
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1. Sailors Leaving Because of Poor Leadership 
In an attempt to understand why talented sailors are voluntarily deciding to leave 
the Navy, an independent study called the 2014 Navy Retention Survey was designed and 
conducted by active duty sailors. By taking statements from more than 5,000 sailors, the 
study brought to light current problems with talent management and senior leadership. 
Three core areas were targeted to place a value on how sailors felt about quality of work, 
quality of life, and quality of leadership, all of which combined make up what the survey 
defines as quality of service.156 Although both quality of work and quality of life have 
much to do with leadership, I will only be analyzing quality of leadership.  
Key findings in the survey exposed two naval leadership flaws: sailors desiring 
leadership positions with increased responsibility are decreasing, and there is a large degree 
of distrust of those in senior leadership positions. The survey results show that half of 
responding sailors do not want their bosses’ job. Comments indicate an increasing belief that 
positions of senior leadership, specifically operational command, is less 
desirable because of increasing risk aversion (68.7 percent), high 
administrative burden (56.4 percent), and, in some cases, a pay inversion 
where commanding officers are paid up to 10 percent less than the mid-
career officers they lead.157  
Furthermore, almost 40 percent of sailors believe that senior leadership is less than 
adequate, indicating a lack of trust between seniors and subordinates, and more than 50 
percent believe that senior leaders do not care what their subordinates think or hold 
themselves to the same standards they hold their subordinates to.158  
2. Poor Leadership and Risk Aversion 
One key aspect, as the survey has shown, is risk and risk-aversion in the armed 
forces today. On the one hand, the risks that go with most military jobs, if not taken 
seriously, can result in damage to equipment and personnel or, in the most serious cases, 
death. Thus, the armed services have a plethora of risk mitigation publications. In April 
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1998, the Army published FM 100–14 dealing with managing risk.159 In 2006, FM 100–
14 was replaced by FM 5–19 and given the new name, Composite Risk Management. 
Now called ATP 5–19, the Army, like the Navy and other branches, is using operational 
risk management to mitigate risk during all phases of a service member’s life, including 
off-duty activities.  
While the success of these programs can be seen in organizations like the aviation 
community, there is a problem with attempting to identify all risk through risk matrices. 
Kent Wall describes how risk matrices attempt to provide an easy measure of risk, but 
ultimately they produce an irrelevant portrayal of information because they do not 
account for the desired outcome of the user.160 Therefore, a two-dimensional matrix 
using probability and severity will eventually lead the user to believe that if all proper 
precautions are not taken, an undesirable outcome will occur.161 Ultimately, this mindset 
will result in leaders being unwilling to make a decision as they fear that no matter what 
choice they make, it will inevitably lead to a mistake.162 Fear of making a mistake 
resulting in less than optimum performance is considered a risk-averse environment.  
To further exacerbate the fear of making a mistake, service members are 
increasingly fearful of the zero-defect mentality. Ensign Bethany Craft, who provided her 
capstone essay “End the Zero-defects Mentality” to Proceedings magazine, wrote, “The 
one mistake you’re out mentality is rampant, which means that all mistakes and crimes 
become the same mistake, because the punishment is the same.”163 While some might 
conclude that an ensign does not have the fleet experience to comment on such issues, 
current leadership must evaluate these observations and realize that future leaders of the 
Navy already view the organization this way. 
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Table 3 shows the results when sailors were asked if they believed the Navy had a 
risk-averse culture.164 The data concludes, “68.7% of Sailors agree or strongly agree 
when asked if ‘the Navy has a risk averse culture,’ officers (86.3%) are significantly 
more pessimistic than their enlisted counterparts (46.4%).”165 
Table 3.   Perception of a Risk-Averse Culture166 
Enlisted  Officer  
Strongly Agree or Agree  42.3%  75.0%  
Neutral  31.7%  14.1%  
Disagree or Strongly Disagree  18.4%  8.3%  
Do Not Know  7.7%  2.6%  
 
Table 4 shows the results when sailors were asked if the Navy had a zero defect 
mentality. The data of the 2014 survey concludes, “60.6% agreeing with this statement. 
Officers are once again decidedly more pessimistic than their enlisted counterparts, with 
75% of officers agreeing or strongly agreeing, as compared to 42.3% of enlisted.”167  
Table 4.   Perception of a Zero Defect Mentality168 
Enlisted  Officer  
Strongly Agree or Agree  46.4%  86.3% 
Neutral  33.7%  8.5%  
Disagree or Strongly Disagree  10.7%  4.2%  
Do Not Know  9.1%  1.0%  
 
These numbers alone do not sound any alarms indicating that something is wrong 
with leadership. If the Navy has chosen to operate in a risk-averse environment stemming 
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from a zero-defect mentality resulting in fewer mishaps, these positive results should 
correlate to quality senior leadership, subordinates trusting their leaders, and senior leaders 
who are tune with the needs of their subordinates. However, this is not the case. Tables 5–8 
indicate, as per the 2014 survey results, that quality of leadership, trust in leadership, 
leadership safekeeping, and leadership accountability are overall viewed in a negative 
manner.  
Table 5.   “Quality of Navy Senior Leadership”169  
Enlisted  Officer  
Excellent or Good  26.9%  31.7%  
Neutral  25.8%  27.9%  
Marginal or Poor  46.7%  39.9%  
Do Not Know  0.6%  0.4%  
Table 6.    “I Trust the Navy’s Senior Leaders”170 
Enlisted  Officer  
Excellent or Good  29.2%  31.9%  
Neutral  27.0%  31.0%  
Marginal or Poor  41.7%  33.6%  
Do Not Know  2.0%  3.4%  
Table 7.   “Senior Leaders Care about What I Think”171  
Enlisted  Officer  
Agree  18.1%  18.2%  
Neutral  28.6%  32.1%  
Disagree  53.3%  49.7%  
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Table 8.   “Senior Leaders Hold Themselves Accountable”172  
Enlisted  Officer  
Agree  18.2%  21.5%  
Neutral  27.8%  31.6%  
Disagree  54.1%  46.9%  
 
These survey results show that the current perception of a zero-defects work 
environment, and the perception that senior leaders do not appear to be taking 
responsibility for their own actions, results in subordinates feeling that each decision they 
make may be their last if the results are anything less than spectacular. In her article, 
Ensign Craft goes on to say, “the zero-defect mentality seems to foster an environment 
where military personnel compromise their integrity to keep from risking their career.”173 
In a hypothetical situation wherein leaders do not hold themselves accountable and 
subordinates are too afraid to make a decision, the outcome will certainly be less than the 
highest standard the Navy always seeks to achieve.  
In summary, DHS and the Navy both have lessons to learn about being proactive 
when implementing leadership training, but the leadership training programs of the Navy 
and other branches are more developed than those of DHS. While implementing 
organizational-wide leadership training after a leadership failure event has occurred will 
likely decrease the same failures from happening again, it is much more desirable to 
develop these programs first in an attempt to mitigate leadership failures. Furthermore, 
DHS does not have to learn the hard way that senior employees are not the only ones who 
need the training. The initial leadership failures that drove the Navy to develop new 
leadership training programs was the recognition that low ranking individuals were the 
ones most in need of such training. This fact should be a warning to DHS as it is currently 
implementing its leadership training using a top-down approach.174  
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The Navy’s history of leadership program implementation shows that the process of 
developing effective leadership programs is not easy and needs constant attention. DHS 
must understand that distributing leadership training material through online and distance 
learning mechanisms may result in the opposite of one of the objectives of the DHS 
leadership development program, which is to maintain accountability over programs that 
are not administered by people. Also, DHS should implement a formal mentorship program 
throughout the ranks. Having a mentor gives subordinates a feedback loop that can be 
formal or informal, provides them with a source of experience and knowledge, and 
provides a backup to non-personalized training, such as e-learning. Lastly, and in the 
author’s opinion most important, is recognizing that individuals will make mistakes as they 
develop as leaders. If is up to senior leadership, mentors, bosses, and supervisors to not 
only let individuals make mistakes as they grow within the ranks of DHS, but also let them 
know that it is ok to make mistakes in the training environment and even operationally if 
the mistake is minor. A zero-defect organizational climate, combined with a risk-averse 
culture, is the least likely place for leadership development to occur.  
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V. THE FUTURE OF DHS LEADERSHIP TRAINING 
This thesis has identified three essential factors and six sub-factors that are 
required to have an effective leadership training program. The DOD experience with all 
of them makes for an illuminating comparison to DHS. In this chapter, I evaluate the 
three essential factors required for an effective leadership training program, as well as 
their sub-components, which are the building blocks of the program.  
A. TRAINING MATERIAL 
The first essential factor is training material. DHS has yet to determine which 
leadership characteristics it wishes to see in all its employees, and thus, all attempts at 
leadership training have been broad strokes of forced education with no clear goal in 
mind. To develop adequate training material, DHS must develop a model to address 
desired outcomes, standardize training for all DHS components, evaluate the material for 
effectiveness, and hold employees accountable for completing the training.  
1. Develop a Model 
The Navy relies on its leadership competency model as the foundation for 
leadership training. According to CNL, “The NLCM initiative ensures Sailors achieve 
specific leadership training milestones within their career,” and “formal reviews of the 
NLCM are utilized to modify, change, or revise training requirements.”175 These reviews 
have formulated conclusions on what methods are best to train sailors, what type of 
leadership skills they need throughout their career, and when they need them. The 
methodology is not perfect, but this is where the DOD is succeeding and DHS is failing. 
DOD and DHS will always be unable to provide the latest and greatest leadership training 
because the amount of time it takes for a government entity to determine a new methods 
effectiveness, package it into training material, and then analyze the results is a long 
                                                 
175 Romero and Loesch, Delivery of Naval Leadership Training, 4.  
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process.176 However, what the Navy has done is establish a baseline requirement for 
leadership training and its delivery. DHS has yet to follow suit.  
The DHS Employee Training Plan, written in 2004 and updated in 2009, 
recommended the creation of teams to “formalize DHS Training Design and Delivery 
Standards that strengthen the effectiveness of the time and effort spent in training at 
DHS,” and to create an Employee Training Plan Steering Committee to work with the 
Learning Leadership Council.177 A 2014 GAO report, written to follow up on these 
recommendations, concluded that DHS’s Leadership Development Program was still in 
the process of developing a model for building leadership skills and that the office “has 
not clearly identified program goals and the measures it uses to assess program 
effectiveness.”178 
At the moment, the author believes that the Leader Development Framework,179 
consisting of a five-tiered approach, which is intended to reach all DHS employees 
through seven modules of leadership training, is the most comprehensive plan to date. 
Furthermore, this plan, unlike previous plans, is actually being implemented throughout 
DHS and, if nothing else, is receiving feedback from various supervisors and managers. 
2. Standardization 
If leadership training is not standardized, it will be impossible to measure the 
effectiveness of the material. For too long, individual DHS departments have claimed that 
their component would not benefit from standardized training because their methods are 
far too different from their counterparts. This excuse was a contributing factor to the 
failures during Hurricane Katrina, and these do not need to be repeated. The case of the 
DOD is a prime example of how a large organization with far more personnel than DHS 
can create standardized training material for its members. It would be beneficial for DHS 
                                                 
176 Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 2.  
177 Steering Committee, DHS Employee Training Plan, 43.  
178 Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, intro.  
179 See Appendix D for leader development framework.  
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to explore how the DOD determines what type of training it considers mandatory for all 
leaders and how it decides on the frequency of its delivery. 
3. Evaluation and Accountability  
DHS cannot rely on leadership training self-reporting. In a perfect world, one 
would expect DHS and DOD employees to complete all required training because it is 
important to them and because they value the information their organization expects them 
to learn. Sadly, this is not the case. DHS is recognizing the fact that evaluation and 
feedback on training is essential. The 2009 update to the DHS Employee Training Plan 
stated:  
With evaluation data, DHS gains greater insight into precisely where 
training creates value and when other interventions, such as job aids, 
might be more cost effective. As stewards of public resources, it is 
imperative that DHS be in a position to better describe the return on 
investment that training brings.180  
However, in a 2014 statement to the chair on homeland security and governmental 
affairs, the GAO reported that since 2003, DHS has been unable to evaluate and assess 
skills based training within the department.181 
In 2014, DHS attempted to assess the quality of its training through linkage, 
clarity, and measurable target.182 Linkage is the tie between training and program goals. 
Critics of the leadership development program have stated that they are unable to 
determine how some of their programs related to the overall goal of DHS. Clarity 
describes the many abstract terms and phrases that the LPD uses within the training itself. 
Examples include phrase such as “best practices” and “developmental activity.” Critics 
argue that some of the instruction is too vague and therefore difficult, if not impossible, 
to teach and understand. Targets are a bit vague as well. I believe that in the future, DHS 
will develop something similar to the Navy’s fleet requirements, which will allow DHS 
                                                 
180 Steering Committee, DHS Employee Training Plan, 37.  
181 Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 2.  
182 Ibid., 36.  
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to ensure that employees hit certain targets throughout their career track. The 2014 report 
states,  
developing measurable targets could help DHS determine whether the 
program’s performance is meeting expectations. To set appropriate targets, 
however, it will be important for the LDP Office to first clearly identify 
program goals and ensure its performance measures link to the goals.183  
This statement reinforces the need for a model that identifies and clarifies DHS’s 
leadership goals. 
B. DELIVERY MECHANISM 
Second, DHS must develop a delivery system to ensure that all employees have 
access to leadership training material. Although the DOD may not possess or implement 
the most cutting edge theories on leadership development, it does have the means to 
deliverer the training it has, which is something DHS has yet to achieve. DHS has a vast 
amount of experience in its ranks from personnel who have been involved in homeland 
security operations since 9/11. These individuals are prime candidates for participation in 
focus groups and think tanks, the sole focus of which would be to figure out what type of 
periodic leadership training will benefit the organization the most and how and when it 
should be delivered. 
DHS must consider all types of training delivery when developing and 
incorporating leadership training throughout the ranks. DHS Training Plan Steering 
Committee expressed its opinion that e-learning would change the way DHS trained its 
employees.184 Additionally, it stated five key areas where e-learning would have the most 
effect on training delivery:185  
 Increasing access to training resources 
 Increasing consistency of training materials for program delivery 
 Increasing access to quality training materials 
                                                 
183 Ibid., 39.  
184 Steering Committee, DHS Employee Training Plan, 39.  
185 Ibid.  
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 Reducing travel and per diem expenses associated with training 
 Reducing loss of productivity due to travel. 
 
Each reason has merit but also carries hidden consequences. Using e-learning for 
increased access and program delivery may make it easier for DHS to deliver its training 
products, but it does not ensure they will be used. The DOD has thousands of online 
training tools, but only a few are regarded as annual training requirements, and the rest 
are not given the same amount of attention. The author believes that DHS’s reasoning 
behind increased e-learning capacity lies more on the fourth and fifth purposes, which are 
purely financial. Incorporating financial efficiencies into any training model is likely to 
be at the top of the priority list. However, it should never be higher than the overall 
objective of delivering effective training and making sure that employees are actual 
engaging the material. Furthermore, e-learning programs must be developed so they are 
not susceptible to the point-and-click level of training. (This is where individuals pay 
minimal attention to the material as they are only concerned with reaching the end of the 
lesson to fulfill the training requirement). 
DHS has already identified that a blended method of training delivery is the most 
effective. Just as e-learning can be ineffective due to the lack of engagement verification 
for the user, classroom lectures can be just as ineffective for those who choose to 
approach lecture as a passive learning activity. Leadership training should be given 
through various platforms, such as e-learning, classroom training, group interaction, 
scenario based training, and teach back instruction. There is no perfect method to 
leadership training because individuals absorb material in different ways. Therefore, 
using a blending of solutions should create the best chance of training the largest number 
of individuals.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
Lastly, DHS must implement these changes. It can no longer wait for a 100 
percent effective leadership program because this ideal does not exist. The program must 
be implemented and evaluated before the fine tuning can occur. One way to implement 
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these changes is by targeting career milestones. Individuals will need to learn new 
leadership skills as they progress through the ranks, and it is up to DHS to decide who 
receives what type of training and when. Promotion windows are a great opportunity to 
implement new training. The answer should not be “learn as you go;” rather, it should be 
a proactive approach to leadership training through all levels and phases of one’s career. 
Also, DHS must deliver leadership training to all employees simultaneously, rather than 
starting with the SES and working its way down. This type of approach will leave non-
SES and supervisor personnel feeling as if senior leadership is out of touch with the 
general workforce, which will lead to the continual and gradual decline—as I have 
observed in OPM surveys.  
1. Milestones 
On paper, it appears that DHS has identified its shortcomings and has in fact set 
target dates to fix what was broken as well as develop new programs as necessary. In 
2004, DHS identified a need for leadership training, and shortly thereafter the employee 
training plan was established. When the employee training plan was updated in 2009, it 
contained many of the same recommendations in 2004, as if nothing had changed. In 
2010, DHS formed the Leadership Development Program (LDP), and in 2011, it 
developed the Leadership Development Framework to develop a five-year plan to 
implement the LDP.186 It is apparent that leadership training and development programs 
have been kicked down the road for the last seven years. Leaders of the programs or 
initiatives need to be accountable for not developing programs in a timely manner. In 
2012, DHS spent 1.1 billion on training and education.187 It is hard to believe that a 
standard, organization-wide leadership program takes several billion dollars and nearly a 
decade to complete.  
                                                 
186 Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 10.  
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2. Bottom-up Approach 
The DOD recognizes that its newest members are also future leaders and therefore 
places a strong emphasis on leadership training for junior personnel. DHS has identified 
five categories of employees within its organizations: executive, manager, supervisor, 
team leader, and team member. DHS appears to be taking a top-down approach by 
training its senior and executive members first.188 The reason for this situation, as stated 
by the LDP managers, is “the office prioritized implementation of the supervisor tier at 
the direction of the then deputy secretary, who identified supervisors as a critical nexus 
between strategic leadership and employee performance.”189 While this opinion may be 
true, the numbers from OPM surveys suggest that junior personnel need to be trained 
first, or at the same time, as executive and managers. Such a bottom-up approach may 
help junior personnel understand what senior leadership is trying to achieve, as well as let 
them know that their jobs as team leaders and team members are not undervalued. This 
measure may increase employee’s perception of the organization, which should increase 
the overall view of leadership within the organization.190  
3. Understand/Manage Duplication 
Allowing its component agencies to conduct leadership training at the 
organizational level is setting DHS up for future problems regarding training duplication. 
As DHS develops standardized training material, there will be a transition period during 
which individuals may find themselves taking department-wide training that resembles 
training provided by their unit. This overlap is not bad, unless the transition period last 
too long. Duplication could mean twice the labor hours and twice the cost. Feedback on 
this issue was provided by DHS Fleet Law Enforcement Training Center when it 
expressed that it already had programs in place that were similar to programs DHS was 
considering implementing organization wide.191 DHS must do a cost benefit analysis 
                                                 
188 Ibid., 24.  
189 Ibid., 25.  
190 See Appendix E for examples of LDP’s for selected DHS departments.  
191 Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 28.  
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comparing training at the organizational level and training at the component level to 
determine the best method of delivery. In this connection, DHS should evaluate DOD 
leadership training distribution, effectiveness, and cost.  
While specific procedural training is not the type of training DHS wants to teach 
on a large scale, due to differences in component operations, leadership is a topic that can 
be discussed to components in a standardized manner. Officials from organizations, such 
as TSA and the Coast Guard, expressed their desire for both unit specific training and 
LDP organizational training because the two combined form the best overall method 
leadership training.192 However, flaws in department-wide leadership training have been 
identified. Not all supervisors and managers do the same thing. Some examples include 
supervisor involvement with contractors, hiring new employees, and various procedural 
activities that do not exist in certain organizations.  
Department-wide training is never perfect for everyone, and it is up to DHS to 
provide individual supervisors the latitude to determine what is useful to them and what 
is not. Both departmental and component personnel who are advocating for better 
leadership training must recognize that at some point there will be overlap during which 
department-wide training will not address the nuances of component specific leadership 
traits, characteristics, and expectations; however, it does in fact identify and train to 
leadership characteristics and methodologies that are helpful to all employees working 
for DHS.  
 
                                                 
192 Ibid., 31. 
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APPENDIX A. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PER YEAR IN 
SURVEYS 













                                                 
193 Adapted from Office of Personnel Management, “Data Analysis and Documentation: Employee 
Surveys,” accessed August 14, 2016, http://www.fedview.opm.gov/.  
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APPENDIX B. LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS OPM SURVEY 
Table 10.   OPM Survey: Leadership Questions194  







Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
11.5% 29.3% 24.1% 19.4% 15.7% 401,121 7,849 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
17.2% 35.1% 24.1% 11.1% 12.5% 383,737 24,649 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
19.2% 45.1% 21.9% 7.0% 6.7% 379,628 25,756 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
16.2% 45.2% 19.6% 10.9% 8.2% 401,551 5,334 







Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
16.5% 44.6% 23.1% 8.8% 7.0% 379,267 27,154 
 
 
                                                 
194 Adapted from 2014 OPM Federal Viewpoint Survey  
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(58) Managers promote communication among different work units (for example, about 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
14.6% 37.9% 22.1% 14.4% 10.9% 393,192 14,282 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
16.0% 40.4% 22.0% 11.9% 9.7% 392,340 14,928 
(60) Overall, how good a job do you feel is being done by the manager directly above your 
immediate supervisor? 
Very Good Good Fair Poor Very Poor 




# of Do Not 
Know 
25.0% 34.3% 22.7% 9.3% 8.7% 384,360 23,479 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 
20.0% 32.6% 23.8% 12.8% 10.8% 402,356 5,387 






Disagree Strongly Disagree 




# of Do Not 
Know 





APPENDIX C. VARIATION OF RESPONSES FROM 2012–2014 







                                                 
195 Source: Office of Personnel Management, “Trend Analysis: 2011 vs. 2012 vs. 2013 Results,” 
accessed September 6, 2016, https://www.fedview.opm.gov/2013/Reports/FHCSComp.asp?AGY=ALL. 
Percentages Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree Nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree
Question # 2014/2013/2012 2014/2013/2012 2014/2013/2012 2014/2013/2012 2014/2013/2012
53 6.4      6.5       7.5 19.6   23.4   25.4 20.2   23.4   25.4 23.4   24.7   23.9 30.5   22.0   19.3
54 11.1   12.3   13.5   28.0   32.3   33.4 23.5   22.6   23.3   14.1   15.1   14.2   23.3   17.7   15.6
55 13.2   13.1   13.9   43.1   41.3   41.9   24.2   24.7   23.7   9.1     10.5   10.3 10.3   10.4   10.2
56 9.4    10.6   11.8 36.6   39.9   41.4 21.3   21.4   20.9 16.2   14.7   14.1 16.5   13.4   11.8
57 9.4    10.2    11.4 34.5   37.2   38.8 27.1   27.1   26.7 13.7   13.5   12.7 15.2   12.0   10.8
58 8.3    9.0   10.0 28.6   30.8   32.4 23.1   24.0   23.7 19.2   19.2   18.2 20.8   17.0   15.7
59 9.1    9.7   10.8 31.4   34.4   35.3 24.5   24.7   24.4 16.5   16.1   15.5 18.5   15.1   14.1
60 16.5   16.9   18.3 28.8   30.1   30.8 25.6   26.5   25.9 13.8  13.4  12.8 15.3   13.1   12.2
61 13.2   14.5   16.6 25.2   27.3   29.6 24.1   23.5   23.5 17.3   16.5    14.9 20.1   18.1   15.4
62 11.7   12.6   13.5   27.1   28.8   29.5 28.6   28.5   28.6 15.2   14.5  14.3 17.5   15.7   14.2  
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APPENDIX D. LEADER DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
Figure 6.  Leader Development Framework196  
 
 
                                                 
196 Source: Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 27.  
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APPENDIX E. EXAMPLES OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS 
Figure 7.  Examples of Leadership Development Programs197  
 
 
                                                 
197 Source: Government Accountability Office, DHS Training, 18.  
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